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CITATIONS TO STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-7 
A limited partner shall not become liable 
as a general partner, unless in addition 
to the exercise of his rights and powers 
as a limited partner he takes part in the 
control of the business. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-10 . . . . . 
A limited partner shall have the same 
rights as a general partner to: 
A. Have the partnership books kept at 
the principal place of business of 
the partnership, and at all times to 
inspect and copy any of them; 
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B. Have on demand true and full 
information of all things affecting 
the partnership, and a formal account 
of partnership affairs whenever 
circumstances render it just and 
reasonable; and, 
C. Have dissolution and winding up by a 
decree of court. 
A limited partner shall have the right to 
receive a share of the profits or other 
compensation by way of income, and to the 
return of his contribution as provided in 
§§ 48-2-15 and 48-2-16. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 § 48-2-26 3, 8, 9, 11 
A contributor, unless he is a general 
partner, is not a proper party to 
proceedings by or against a partnership, 
except where the object is to enforce a 
limited partner right against or liability 
to the partnership. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1 
(1953) 7, 17 
In a derivative action brought by one or 
more shareholders or members to enforce a 
right of a corporation or of an 
unincorporated association, the 
corporation or association having failed 
to enforce a right which may properly be 
asserted by it, the complaint shall be 
verified and shall allege (1) that the 
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at 
the time of the transaction of which he 
complains or that his share or membership 
thereafter devolved on him by operation of 
law, and (2) that the action is not a 
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a 
-v-
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court of the United States which it would 
not otherwise have. The complaint shall, 
also allege with particularity the 
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to 
obtain the action he desires from the 
director to a comparable authority and, if 
necessary, from the shareholders or 
members, and the reasons for his failure 
to obtain the action or for not making the 
effort. The derivative action may not be 
maintained if it appears that the 
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately 
represent the interests of the 
shareholders or members similarly situated 
in enforcing the right of the corporation 
or association. The action shall not be 
dismissed or compromised without the 
approval of the court, and notice of the 
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be 
given to shareholders or members in such 
manner as the court directs. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) . . . 2 
When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination 
by the court that there is no just reason 
for delay and upon an express direction 
for the entry of judgment. In the absence 
of such determination and direction, any 
order or other form of decision, 
direction, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all of the claims 
or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate 
the action as to any of the claims or 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Cont'd) 
parties, and the order or other form of 
decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights 
and liabilities of all the parties. 
CITATIONS TO OTHER AUTHORITIES 
60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnerships, § 380 
Annotation, 26 A.L.R. 4th 264 § 6 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (1916) 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act (Rev.) 
§§ 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004 (1976) 
Utah Limited Partnership Act, L. 1921, 
Ch. 88, § 1 et se^ • . . 1 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the lower court err in ruling that: 
1. Utah Law does not recognize a derivative action by 
limited partners of a limited partnership; and 
2. It is improper under Utah law to join derivative 
claims and direct claims in the same action. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Determinative statutory provisions in the present case are 
Utah Code Ann. § 4 8-2-1 et seg. (19 53) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is plaintiff's appeal from a final order certified 
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
granting defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants' Motion 
asserted that all plaintiffs' claims of a derivative nature 
should be dismissed because a derivative action may not be 
maintained on behalf of a limited partnership in Utah, and 
because in any event plaintiffs incorrectly joined direct and 
derivative claims in the same complaint. 
Because no single reason was given for the trial court's 
ruling, respondents presume that the lower court considered and 
relied upon each of the grounds asserted in support of the 
Motion, and address those grounds separately herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley are 
limited partners in the Jeremy, Ltd. [Verified Complaint at 
If 15.] The Jeremy, Ltd. is a limited partnership organized 
under the Utah Limited Partnership Act pursuant to a Limited 
Partnership Agreement. [Verified Complaint at If 1.] The sole 
general partner of the Jeremy, Ltd. is Jeremy Service Corpora-
tion, one of the named defendants. [Verified Complaint at 
If 73.] Together, Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley own 
more than 75% of the limited partnership units. [Second 
Amended Complaint at If 18. Cf. Verified Complaint at If 15.] 
Plaintiffs Bagley Corporation and Gerald H. Bagley brought 
this action alleging derivative claims as limited partners of 
Jeremy, Ltd. [Verified Complaint Claims 1-9 and 12-15.] They 
also brought several direct claims against various defendants 
on behalf of themselves. [Verified Complaint, Claims 10-11. ] 
The gravamen of plaintiffs1 Complaint asserts that the general 
partner of the Jeremy, Ltd. breached fiduciary duties it owes 
to the limited partnership in failiiig to initiate litigation 
against the other named defendants. [See generally, Verified 
Complaint.] There is no allegation that the general partner is 
insolvent, unavailable or unable to meet its obligations or 
carry out the responsibilities and duties of the Jeremy, Ltd. 
Respondents vigorously contest the charges of wrongdoing 
made in appellants* Statement of Facts, but for purposes of 
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this Motion they accept as true, as did the Trial Court, the 
factual allegations in the Verified Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although appellants analogize to the law of corporate 
shareholders to argue that they enjoy a common law power to 
maintain a derivative action on behalf of the limited partner-
ship, no such power is granted by the Utah Limited Partnership 
Act. Where a statute creates an entity and grants to it 
express and enumerated powers, courts cannot imply additional 
powers by grafting common law rights onto the existing 
statutory scheme. 
This rule is particularly applicable where provisions of 
the Limited Partnership Act expressly bar all but certain 
specified actions by limited partners on behalf of the partner-
ship. To allow limited partners to initiate litigation on 
behalf of the partnership permits limited partners to control 
or manage partnership business, contrary to express provisions 
of the Utah Limited Partnership Act. Section 48-2-26 of the 
Act expressly provides that a limited partner is not a proper 
party to proceedings by or against the partnership. It is 
significant that in the sole Utah case interpreting Section 
48-2-26 as a bar to derivative actions by limited partners, 
this Court cites the rule that limited partners are given no 
greater than those provided by statute in the Limited 
Partnership Act. 
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Under the circumstances, plaintiffs' analogy to the law of 
corporate shareholders is inapposite. The fact that the 
Legislature has specifically conferred the power to bring 
derivative actions on corporate shareholders underscores that 
such rights must be granted by statute to an entity created by 
statute such as a corporation or limited partnership. 
Further, there are substantial differences between corpo-
rate shareholders and limited partners. Most significantly, a 
derivative action by corporate shareholders is needed because 
the shareholder may bring suit only on behalf of the corpora-
tion and the derivative action is literally the only remedy. 
By contrast, a limited partner has a number of remedies 
consistent with the nature of the limited partnership that 
obviate the need for a derivative action. Particularly in this 
case, plaintiffs are well protected by the Limited Partnership 
Agreement and their right to bring a direct action against the 
general partner. 
Finally, courts that have allowed derivative actions by 
limited partners have done so only where effective disability 
of the general partner requires such an action by a limited 
partner. To allow the derivative action in this case would 
subvert the statutory scheme by allowing the limited partner to 
interfere with the business judgment of a viable, acting 
general partner without any showing that the partner is unable 
or wrongfully unwilling to act in behalf of the partnership. 
-4-
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs could bring a 
derivative action, it has long been the law of the Utah that 
due to an inherent conflict of interest, direct and derivative 
claims may not be joined in the same action. In the instant 
case, plaintiffs assert personal claims for conversion and 
defamation which should not and cannot be joined with 
derivative claims for and on behalf of the other limited 
partners. Accordingly, plaintiffs' derivative claims were 
properly dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH LAW PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ASSERT 
A DERIVATIVE CLAIM ON BEHALF OF THE 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP. 
A. A Limited Partnership Is Created by Statute and Rights 
and Privileges of Limited Partners Must Be Found In 
the Utah Limited Partnership Act. 
A Limited Partnership in Utah is not an amorphous develop-
ment of the common law,* but is a definite legal entity created 
by statute. Utah Limited Partnerships are created under the 
adaptive version of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 48-2-1 et. seg.—a uniform state law which has been 
enacted in nearly all states without significant changes. 
Although the Utah Act has detailed provisions outlining the 
duties and liabilities of limited partners and specifying 
powers, it contains no provisions which authorize a limited 
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partner to bring a derivative action.1 Rather, the rights of 
a limited partner are those expressly enumerated in UCA 
§ 48-2-10 which provides: 
A limited partner shall have the same rights as a 
general partner to: 
(a) Have the partnership books kept at the 
principal place of business of the partnership, and at 
all times to inspect and copy any of them; 
(b) Have on demand true and full information of 
all things effecting the partnership, and a formal 
account of partnership's affairs whenever circum-
stances render it just and reasonable; and 
(c) Have dissolution and winding up by decree of 
the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-10(1) (19 53) . 
The rule has long existed in Utah that where a statute 
creates an entity, grants to it express and enumerated powers, 
and describes the mode of their exercise, the courts cannot 
imply additional powers. Hadlock v. Callister, 85 Utah 510, 39 
P.2d 1082, 1085 (1935) [Powers conferred on corporation by 
statute are limited by express language of the statute]. 
Accordingly, appellants1 argument that this Court should 
recognize the power to bring derivative actions nowhere granted 
1
 The fact that the Uniform Limited Partnership Act does not 
give limited partners the power to act on behalf of the 
partnership was made clear by its drafters. In 1976 an 
amendment was proposed which would authorize derivative actions 
by limited partners. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act 
(rev.) §§ 1001, 1002, 1003, 1004 (1976). If the Act already 
authorized such actions, the specific new provision would be 
unnecessary. Significantly, the Utah Legislature has not 
adopted the proposed revision. 
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in the Utah Limited Partnership Act is unconvincing.2 Any 
such common law power directly conflicts with the statutory 
scheme and cannot be granted by the courts. 
B. A Common Law Power to Bring Derivative Actions 
Conflicts With the Present Statutory Scheme Governing 
Limited Partners. 
In order to preserve the rights and status of limited 
partners, the Act reguires that limited partners not 
participate in control or management of partnership affairs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-7 (1953). Under the Act, a limited 
partner does not (1) hold title to the assets of the limited 
partnership, (2) manage those assets, or (3) control litigation 
to which the limited partnership is a party. Wroblewski v. 
Brucher, 550 F.Supp. 742, 745 (W.D. Okla. 1982). The decision 
of whether to initiate litigation against third parties is a 
management decision. To allow plaintiffs to bring this action 
conflicts with the above-cited portion of the Act.3 
2
 Plaintiff's analogy to corporate shareholders is invalid. 
Corporate shareholders have a statutory right to bring 
derivative claims. URCP 23.1; see infra at p. 10. 
3
 Plaintiffs action is also contrary to express provisions of 
the Limited Partnership Agreement entered into by the parties 
to this lawsuit. Section 8.2 of that Agreement provides: "A 
limited partner shall take no part in nor interfere in any 
manner with the conduct or control of the business of the 
partnersip and shall have no right nor authority to act for or 
bind the partnership." 
-7-
Even more specifically, § 48-2-26 provides: 
A contributor [limited partner], unless he is a 
general partner, is not a proper party to proceedings 
by or against the partnership, except where the object 
is to enforce a limited partner's right against or 
liability to the partnership. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2-26 (1953). Numerous courts have inter-
preted this section as barring derivative claims by limited 
partners. See e.g. Yale II Mining Association v. Gilliam, 582 
F.Supp. 893 (W.D.Va. 1984); Browning v. Maurice B. Levien & Co. 
P.C., 44 N.C. App. 701, 762 S.E.2d 355 (1980); Cole v. United 
States, 502 F.Supp. 881, 884-885 (D.Or. 1980); Fox v. Sackman, 
22 Wash. App. 707, 591 P.2d 855, 857 (1979); Amsler v. American 
Home Assurance Co., 348 S.2d 68, 71 (Florida App. 19 77); 
American Discount Corp. v. Saratoga West, Inc., 13 Wash. App. 
890, 537 P.2d 1056, 1060 (1975); Lieberman v. Atlantic Mutual 
Insurance Company, 62 Wash. 2d 922, 385 P.2d 53 (1963). 
In the only Utah case to address the issue, this Court read 
§ 48-2-26 as barring an action by limited partners on behalf of 
the partnership against third parties. In Empire Investment 
Corp. & Associates v. Nielson Construction Co., 508 P.2d 804 
(Utah, 1973), limited partners brought suit on behalf of the 
partnership against sellers of real property after the sellers 
repossessed the property. Dismissing the suit, this Court 
stated in dicta: 
Their rights, if any they have, are against the 
general partner and not the sellers, who simply 
-8-
repossessed the property for failure of all parties to 
pay as provided in the original contract of sale. 
We have a statute which provides: MA contributor, 
unless he is a general partner, is not a proper party 
to proceedings by or against a partnership . . . ." 
See also 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership § 380. 
508 P.2d at 805 (footnote omitted). 
The Court's citation of authority is also significant to 
the instant analysis. The authority cited provides that the 
rights of a limited partner are confined to the rights 
specifically enumerated in the Limited Partnership Act, to have 
full information and receive a share of the income, and to have 
the same rights as a general partner in dissolution and winding 
up by decree of a court. See 60 Am. Jur. 2d, Partnership, 
§ 380. 
Thus in Empire Investment, this Court applied the rule that 
where an entity is created by statute, the court will not 
confer powers; the only proper inference being that the legis-
lature intended that no other or greater powers were given than 
those specified. This rule is particularly applicable where 
the powers sought to be conferred actually conflict with the 
existing statutory scheme. 
C. Analogies to the Law of Corporate Shareholders are 
Inapposite in the Instant Case. 
As noted above, plaintiffs argue that this Court should go 
beyond the statutory parameters of the Utah Limited Partnership 
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Act and, contrary to its express provisions, find a common law 
right to bring a derivative action by analogizing to rights 
accorded corporate shareholders and cestuis que trust. In 
Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich. App. 786, 312 N.W.2d 381 (1981), the 
court stated: 
Such analogies simply are not applicable to provide 
powers not expressly granted by the legislature 
regardless of our own notions of policy or equity. It 
is indeed significant to note that the Michigan 
Legislature has conferred statutorily the rights to 
bring derivative actions to shareholders of Michigan's 
corporations. Such a specific conferment to corporate 
shareholders not only indicates that the Legislature 
was fully aware of derivative rights, but further 
underscores the intent of the legislature not to 
provide such rights to limited partners. Moreover, 
the Michigan Legislature in enacting the corporate 
shareholders derivative provision has demonstrated its 
intent that such a right must be granted by statute to 
a statutory creature such as a corporation or a 
limited partnership. 
312 N.W.2d at 386, 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
Not only are such analogies inapplicable where an entity is 
created by statute with specific powers expressly conferred by 
the Legislature, but there are material differences between 
corporate shareholders and limited partners. Most signifi-
cantly, a derivative action by corporate shareholders is needed 
because a corporate shareholder cannot bring a direct action 
against directors for mismanagement. The director's fiduciary 
duty runs to the corporation, not to the shareholder. Because 
the corporation owns the claim, the shareholder may bring suit 
-10-
only on its behalf. The derivative action is literally the 
only remedy. 
By contrast, the limited partner has a number of remedies 
consistent with the nature of the limited partnership that 
obviate the need for a derivative action. For example, unlike 
the corporate shareholder, a limited partner can create 
remedies to protect his interest by requiring specific provi-
sions in the Limited Partnership Agreement.* 
Similarly, although limited partners give up the right to 
control the partnership in exchange for limited liability by 
entering into the Limited Partnership agreement, they are 
granted a direct right by statute to sue a general partner who 
has breached duties owed to the limited partners. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 48-2-10, 26 (1953). It is thus unnecessary for a 
limited partner to sue derivatively because the partner can sue 
directly for removal or breach of duty, and can seek other 
relief by way of mandatory injunction to require the general 
partner to enforce rights of the partnership vis-a-vis third 
parties. 
4
 In this case it is significant that the limited partnership 
agreement provides in section 18.1 that "upon a vote of the 
parties holding more than 75% of the then outstanding units, 
the general partner may be expelled from the partnership with 
or without cause." Since plaintiffs own more than 75% of the 
outstanding units, they could expel the general partner at any 
time and sue that entity directly for wrongdoing, without 
benefit of a derivative action. 
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Plaintiffs in this case are not in the same position as a 
corporate shareholder, who, without a derivative action must 
suffer in silence when a wrong occurs. The limited partner/ 
plaintiffs in this case, have an abundance of remedies avail-
able. The analogy to corporate law is thus inappropriate. 
D. Sound Policy Supports The Law as It Currently Exists. 
As previously noted, the Utah Limited Partnership Act 
provides limited liability for limited partners unless the 
limited partner takes part in the control or management of the 
partnership. Utah Code. Ann. § 48-2-7 (1953). Control of the 
business for which the general partner has unlimited liability 
is a fundamental tenet of limited partnership law. Harline v. 
Daines, 567 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). However, to graft a common 
law right to bring a derivative action on behalf of the limited 
partnership onto the current law subverts the whole statutory 
scheme by radically increasing the power of limited partners to 
participate in control and management of the partnership 
without a corresponding increase in responsibility or potential 
liability. Unlike the corporate shareholder, there are no 
statutory controls or bond requirements governing derivative 
suits by limited partners. To recognize a derivative action 
the limited partnership context allows a limited partner to 
substitute its business judgment for that of the general 
partner. 
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Current law protects the rights of a limited partner by 
allowing a direct right of action against the general partner. 
At the same time the current statutory scheme requires a 
threshold determination by the courts that the general partner 
has violated the business judgment rule in failing to act, or 
in acting improperly before granting relief against a general 
partner. 
The primary advantage of current law lies in the oppor-
tunity it provides the court to address the threshold issue of 
whether a limited partner should be entitled to initiate a 
lawsuit which the general partner, in the exercise of its sound 
business judgment and exclusive authority has elected not to 
pursue. The "business judgment" rule is well established in 
the corporate context. See e.g. In re Reading Company, 711 
F.2d 509 (3rd Cir. 1983) [court will not disturb judgments of 
board of directors "if they can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose"]; Mountain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 
M.D. App. 185, 461 A.2d 45 (1983) [general rule that, with 
limited exceptions, the court may not interfere or second-guess 
business decisions made by directors in management of 
corporation]. A similar good faith rule is implicit in the 
limited partnership context. 
Accordingly, it is significant in the instant case that a 
viable general partner exists who has consciously decided not 
to bring the claim asserted by plaintiffs, and has in fact, 
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counterclaimed for acts of Gerald H. Bagley committed while he 
was the general partner. This fact alone distinguishes the 
instant case from the majority of cases cited by appellants 
where the reviewing court recognized a right of limited 
partners to bring a derivative action. 
For example, in the leading decision holding that under the 
circumstances there present, a limited partner had a right to 
maintain a derivative action, the court in Klebenow v. New York 
Produce Association, 344 F.2d 294 (2nd Cir. 1965) stated: 
We would indeed expect that the New York courts would 
require strong allegations and proof of disqualifi-
cation or wrongful refusal by the general partners to 
sue on the partnership's behalf--a mere difference of 
opinion would be nowhere near enough. But the 
allegations in the instant complaint that the 
partners, including the liquidating partner, have 
completely divested themselves of power in favor of a 
stranger who is acting on behalf of creditors . . . 
meets this test. 
344 F.2d at 299 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
In fact, the disability or disqualification of the general 
partner was a significant factor in the court's decision to 
allow a derivative action by limited partners in practically 
every case cited by plaintiffs in support of their position. 
See e.g. Riviera Congress Associates v. Yassky, 18 N.Y. 2d 540, 
277 N.Y.S. 2d 386, 223 N.E. 2d 876 (1966); McCully v. Radack, 
27 Md.App. 350, 340 A.2d 374 (1975); Smith v. Bader, 458 
F. Supp. 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying California law); Strain 
v. Seven Hills Associates, 75 A.D.2d 360, 429 N.Y.S. 2d 424 
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(1980) (applying Ohio law) ; Phillips v. KULA 200, Wick Realty, 
Inc., 629 P.2d 119 (Haw. App. 1981); Jaffe v. Harris, 109 Mich. 
App. 786, 312 N.W. 2d 381 (1981). See also, Annot. 26 ALR 4th 
264 § 6. Cjf. Plaintiff Appellant's Brief at pp. 40-41.s 
No such disqualification is present in the instant case. 
The substance of what plaintiffs allege is that a viable, 
acting general partner has decided not to pursue the claims of 
plaintiffs. To allow a derivative action under these and 
similar circumstances would allow a limited partner to initiate 
litigation resulting in unnecessary or wasteful expenditure of 
partnership assets to the detriment of both the defendants and 
the limited partnership without first establishing any right to 
so proceed. The present statutory scheme, requiring proof in 
court that the good faith judgment of a viable general partner 
was incorrect, should not be circumvented. 
In sum, for this court to recognize a right to bring a 
derivative action where the legislature has not done so is 
inappropriate. The particular facts of the instant case 
5
 Plaintiffs argue that these cases illustrate the 
limitations inherent in the common law power to bring a 
derivative action. It is difficult to apprehend the logic of 
this argument as applied to the facts of this case, where 
plaintiffs assert that a simple allegation of self-dealing in 
the complaint should be sufficient to overcome any inherent 
limitation and allow them to bring a derivative action. It is 
significant that corporate shareholders are subject to much 
more stringent controls and bond requirements to prevent the 
filing of frivolous derivative claims. 
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neither present a danger of substantial injustice nor advance 
any compelling policy consideration which favors assertion of 
the claim.6 
II. EVEN IF PLAINTIFFS COULD BRING A DERIVA-
TIVE ACTION, UTAH LAW DOES NOT PERMIT 
JOINDER OF DIRECT AND DERIVATIVE CLAIMS 
IN THE SAME ACTION AND THUS THE DERIVA-
TIVE CLAIMS WERE CORRECTLY DISMISSED. 
It has long been the law of Utah that direct and derivative 
claims may not be joined in the same action. Goodliffe v. 
6
 Gerald H. Bagley's status as former general partner and 
guarantor of lender's debt and the fact that the current 
general partner has sued him for fraud in such capacity, draws 
into serious question the propriety of his being a proper 
custodian of the claims under any circumstances, even if proper 
standing did exist under Utah Law. 
Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in 
part: "the derivative action may not be maintained if it 
appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately 
represent the interest of shareholders or members similarly 
situated in enforcing the rights of the corporation of 
association." The complaint correctly points out that 
commencing in the summer of 1982 and extending through 
December, 1984, Gerald H. Bagley was general partner of Jeremy, 
Ltd. Many of the allegations in the complaint relate to 
occurrences within this time period. Specifically, plaintiffs 
allege that delay occurred in the funding of the loan during 
the later part of 1982, and that various delays occurred in the 
funding of construction draws in 1983 and 1984. Those acts 
occurred while Gerald Bagley was general partner of Jeremy, 
Ltd. The facts alleged are sufficient to establish that Bagley 
has materially different interests in the pending lawsuit than 
do other limited partners of the Jeremy, Ltd. and thus does not 
fairly and adequately represent those limited partners. 
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Colonial Corp., 155 P.2d 177, 182 (Utah, 1945). 7 The 
reasoning behind this rule is sound. In a derivative action, 
the plaintiff brings the suit as custodian of the cause of 
action on behalf of the entity and all of its owners. All such 
interests are represented by the person bringing the suit and 
the plaintiff stands in a fiduciary position with respect to 
the others. Id. For plaintiff to assert separate claims for 
distinctly personal relief in the same suit, is deemed to be a 
conflict of interest and is not allowed. As noted by the Utah 
Supreme court in Goodliffe, supra. 
Plaintiffs in this case attempt to join separate 
causes of action for distinctive personal relief, in 
the derivative suit, which they are not permitted to 
do. 
Clearly such a cause of action [personal claim for 
fraud and deceit] has no place in a stockholder suit 
brought for the benefit of the corporation. 
165 P.2d at 182. Accord, Fanchon and Marco, Inc. v. Paramount 
Pictures, 107 F.Supp. 532, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
7
 Since Utah does not recognize a derivative section on 
behalf of limited partners, the Utah case discussed herein 
refers to corporate shareholder derivative actions. The 
rationale is, however, applicable if a derivative action is 
recognized. 
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In the instant case, Gerald H. Bagley asserts personal 
claims for conversion and defamation, which fall squarely 
within the rule in Goodliffe that claims for "distinctive 
personal relief," even though not asserted against a corporate 
defendant, cannot be joined with derivative claims: 
As pointed out in the Price case, supra, involving a 
somewhat parallel situation: "but running through the 
bills in an attempted assertion of a cause of action 
against the individual defendants not for the use and 
benefit of the fuel company but exclusively affecting 
the complainants as individuals. It is for fraud and 
deceit practiced upon in the original sale and 
purchase of the stock which they hold. Clearly such a 
a cause of action has no place in a stockholder's suit 
brought for the benefit of the corporation. 
155 P.2d at 182 (quoting Price v. Union Land Co., 187 F. 886, 
889 (8th Cir. 1911)). 
Plaintiffs' assert that the direct claims of Gerald H. 
Bagley are "incidental" and therefore within the Goodliffe rule 
because they are not "antagonistic to" the limited partner-
ship. However, the incidental relief in Goodliffe is substan-
tially different from the direct claims for relief that have 
been asserted by Bagley in the pending lawsuit. Goodliffe held 
that the joined claims were incidental only to the extent that 
they went to the ability of the former shareholders to insti-
tute or maintain a derivative suit. To the extent plaintiffs 
in Goodliffe sought relief from the individual defendants from 
wrongs committed against plaintiffs as individuals, their 
claims were not incidental and were improperly joined. 155 
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P.2d at 182. The fact that the individual claims did not seek 
relief from the corporation was not controlling. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants lack standing to prosecute the derivative 
aspects of this lawsuit. For the reasons set forth above, 
respondent Lenders respectfully request the court to affirm the 
Judgment of Dismissal entered by the Court below. 
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of March, 1987. 
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